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DETAINER WARRANTS AND THE
SPEEDY TRIAL PROVISION
DAVID L. WALTHER*
When a crime has been committed, and the perpetrator has been
imprisoned by another sovereign before he can be apprehended for
the crime, it is common practice for the district attorney of the
county of the crime to obtain a warrant, on information and belief,
charging the commission of the crime, so that when the time for the
prior imprisonment has expired, the prisoner can be released to the
authorities of the state where the second crime was committed. There
is usually a delay between the time the warrant is issued, and the trial
for the crime, because of the intervening imprisonment. This delay
can cause the issue to be raised whether the prisoner has been deprived
of his right to a speedy trial under the constitutions of the state or the
United States. A minority of jurisdictions have held that, given the
proper facts, the delay may violate the prisoner's right to a speedy
trial, even though the delay was caused by the intervening imprison-
ment.
RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL
Such delay probably does not violate the Wisconsin speedy trial
provision because the Wisconsin provision is somewhat unique. Article
I, Section 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution provides:
In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right
to be heard by himself and counsel; to demand the nature and
cause of the accusation against him; to meet the witnesses face
to face; to have compulsory*process to comple the attendance of
witnesses in his behalf; and in prosecutions by indictment, or
information, to a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the
county or district wherein the offense shall have been committed;
which county or district shall have been previously ascertained
by law.
This provision apparently guarantees a speedy trial only to those
indicted or informed against. If so, the prisoner against whom a de-
tainer warrant has been filed, would not be protected by this provision.
This language of the Wisconsin Constitution is unlike the language
of the speedy trial provision of the United States Constitution. The
6th amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
to a speedy and public trial ...
The right to a speedy trial under this provision has been construed
to arise upon a formal complaint being lodged against the defendant
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in a criminal case.1 Other states with constitutional provisions similar
to the federal provision have also held that a party become an accused,
entitled to a speedy trial, upon the filing of the complaint, even prior
to arrest. 2 Of course, the 6th amendment, and the rights guaranteed
therein are binding, as such, only upon federal courts. 3
LAcK OF SPEEDY TRIAL As VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS
Although the prisoner may not be entitled to the protection of the
6th amendment, or the Wisconsin speedy trial provision, nevertheless,
failure to accord him a speedy trial may violate his rights to due
process under the 14th amendment to the United States Constitution 4
and Article I, Section 8, of the Wisconsin Constitution.5
In Betts v. Brady6 the United States Supreme Court held:
The Sixth Amendment of the national Constitution applies
only to trials in federal courts. The due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment does not incorporate, as such, the
specific guarantees found in the Sixth Amendment, although a
denial by a state of rights or privileges specifically embodied in
that and others of the first eight amendments may, in certain
circumstances, or in connection with other elements, operate, in
a given case, to deprive a litigant of due process of law in viola-
tion of the Fourteenth. Due process of law is secured against
invasion by the federal Government by the Fifth Amendment
and is safeguarded against state action in identical words by the
Fourteenth. The phrase formulates a concept less rigid and
more fluid than those envisaged in other specific and particular
provisions of the Bill of Rights. Its application is less a matter
of rule. Asserted denial is to be tested by an appraisal of the
totality of facts in a given case. That which may, in one setting,
constitute a denial of fundamental fairness, shocking to the
universal sense of justice, may, in other circumstances, and in
the light of other considerations, fall short of such denial. In
the application of such a concept there is always the danger
of falling into the habit of formulating the guarantee into a set
of hard fast rules the application of which in a given case may
be to ignore the qualifying factors wherein disclosed.
The "special circumstances" theory of Betts v. Brady was over-
ruled in Gideon v. Wainright7 insofar as it applied to providing de-
fendants with counsel in serious criminal cases.
I Iva Ikuko Toguri D'Aguino v. United States, 192 F.2d 338 (9th Cir. 1951).
2 Rost v. Municipal Court, 184 Cal. App. 2d 507, 7 Cal. Rptr 869 (1906) ; State
v. Waites, 82 Ohio L. Abs. 356, 163 N.E. 2d 195 (1959) (detainer warrant
filed) ; People v. Jordan, 45 C.2d 697, 290 P. 2d 484 (1955).
3 Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
4". . . nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law."
5 "No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process
of law...
6 Betts v. Brady, supra note 3, at 461-462.
7 No. 155, October Term, 1962 (March 18, 1963).
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The United States Supreme Court again intimated in Hoag v.
New Jerseys that failure by a state to provide a defendant with a
speedy trial may violate the due process clause of the 14th amendment.
"Finally, in the circumstances shown by this record, we cannot hold
that petitioner was denied a 'speedy trial' on the Yager indictment,
whatever may be the reach of the Sixth Amendment under the pro-
visions of the Fourteenth."
The Seventh 9 and Tenth ° Circuits have intimated that lack of
a speedy trial may violate due process. And an Indiana"" and a
Pennsylvania12 federal district court have squarely held that failure
to give a speedy trial can violate 14th amendment due process.
Thus there is substantial, recent, authority in the federal courts
indicating that failure by a state to grant a defendant a speedy trial
may, under the proper circumstances, violate due process.
UNTRIEI DETAINERS As VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS
As stated in Betts v. Brady,13 the question, in determining whether
a prisoner has been deprived of liberty without due process of law,
where trial of a charge for which a detainer warrant has been issued
is delayed because of an intervening imprisonment, is whether an
appraisal of the totality of facts in the case indicates that failure to
give the prisoner a trial on the charge is a denial of fundamental
fairness, shocking to the universal sense of justice.
Several factors must be considered in determining whether the
prisoner's right to due process has been violated.
First, it is not within the absolute power of a district attorney to
have a prisoner returned from a federal prison for trial. While im-
prisoned in a federal penitentiary, the prisoner is in the custody of
the United States. Whether he be released for trial in a state court
has traditionally been considered to be a matter of comity, solely
within the discretion of the United States Attorney General.' 4 Although
the attorney general may release the prisoner for trial, he need not.'-
However, he is usually willing to turn the prisoner over to the state
authorities, upon request, on the condition that the prisoner is promptly
returned to federal prison after the trial.
8356 U.S. 464 (1958).
9 Sawyer v. Barczak, 229 F.2d 805, 812 (7th Cir. 1956), cert. denied 351 U.S.
966 (1956) ; See also Odell v. Burke, 281 F.2d 782 (7th Cir. 1960), cert. denied
364 U.S. 865 (1960), wherein the court held the allegations of the petition
relating to the denial of a speedy trial were not prina facie sufficient to
allege a denial of federal due process.
10 Hastings v. McLeod, 261 F.2d 627 (10th Cir. 1958).
"I United States v. Lane, 193 F. Supp. 395, 397 (N.D. Ind. 1961).
"2 United States v. Maroney, 194 F. Supp. 154 (W.D. Pa. 1961).
13 Supra note 3.
14 Pongi v. Fessenden, 258 U.S. 254 (1922).
15 One may speculate whether due process requires him to release a prisoner to
state authorities upon request.
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The traditional view, adhered to in most of the jurisdictions which
have considered the issue, is that failure to request custody of the
United States Attorney General does not violate the right to a speedy
trial, even though the request would be granted.16 The rationale behind
these decisions is that a delayed trial is the fault of the prisoner him-
self, for having committed a crime in another jurisdiction.
A more enlightened view has been adopted by the New York
Court of Appeals, and by the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia.
In People v. Piscitello" the New York Court of Appeals held:
When the motion to dismiss for undue delay was made, even
though subsequent in point of time to motions, addressed to the
indictment, it should have been granted, absent any showing
of good cause to the contrary by the prosecutor . . . Here there
was no such showing. The fact that defendant, who had been
taken into custody January 18, 1955, a date prior to the indict-
ment, was being held in the Federal detention headquarters,
New York County, awaiting disposition of certain Federal
charges, affords neither explanation nor excuse, since he could
have been produced in the State court upon request, provided
only that he was returned to Federal custody.
In Taylor v. United States's the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia held:
The Government urges that the delay in bringing appellant
to trial was his fault, since it was caused by his imprisonment
in New York. We think his imprisonment there does not excuse
the Government's long delay in bringing him to trial here, in
the absence of a showing that the Government, at a reasonably
early date, sought and was unable to obtain his return for trial.
Also relevant is Rost v. Municipal Court.19 In that case a complaint
was filed and the warrant of arrest issued January 11, 1960, although
defendant wasn't arrested until June 1. The court held that by failing
to arrest defendant for an unreasonably long length of time, the pro-
secution violated his right to a speedy trial.
What is a reasonable time depends upon the circumstances
of the case. There are many situations in which the lapse of
much more than 140 days between complaint and arrest would
not be unreasonable. However, without explanation the lapse of
140 days is on its very face unreasonable where the defendant
is at all times available for service.
1 6 In re Schechtel, 103 Colo. 77, 82 P. 2d 762, 118 A.L.R. 1032 (1938); Applica-
tion of Melton, 342 P. 2d 571 (Okla. Cr. 1959) ; State v. Larkin, 256 Minn.
314, 98 N.W. 2d 70 (1959).
177 N.Y. 2d 387, 165 N.E. 2d 849, 850 (1960).
1s 238 F.2d 259, 261 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
19 .Supra note 2.
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Of course, a prisoner is not "available for service." However, the
principle is analogous, if the prisoner has been made available for
trial by the United States Attorney General.
Secondly, consideration should be given to the effect given the
detainer warrants by the imprisoning sovereignty. In United States v.
Maroney2 ° the court found a violation of due process upon this type
of fact. There the court found that the existence of the charge had an
adverse effect on the commutation of the prisoner's sentence on the
conviction for which he had been imprisoned; that it had an adverse
effect on any possible transfer to a minimum security prison; that it
prevented his being sent to an institution more appropriate for youth-
ful offenders; that it affected his work assignments; that it barred him
from working outside the walls of the institution; and that it had an
adverse effect on the possibility of parole. Because of these facts, the
court found that failure to give the defendant a speedy trial on the
pending charge violated due process.
It could be argued that prison policies are a matter for the im-
prisoning sovereign alone, and that if existence of detainer warrants
deprives the prisoner of prison privileges, such deprivation is not
chargeable to the authority which issued or sought the detainer warrant.
It could also be argued that since prison privileges are not due a
prisoner as a matter of right, that loss of these privileges cannot be
the basis for a claimed lack of due process. Nonetheless, because the
existence of the detainer warrant causes harsher prison policies to be
operative upon the individual prisoner, and to deprive him of benefits
which he otherwise would have, as a matter of grace, if not of right,
the court in the Maroney case was persuaded to find a violation of
due process.
Third for consideration is the effect postponement of the trial will
have on the fairness of the trial when it is ultimately held. This was
the type of fact which influenced the court in United States v. Lane.
2 1
In that case the court held that the disappearance and unavailability
of exhibits and witnesses, coupled with the natural likelihood that the
memory of witnesses who were available would be faltering, operated
to deprive the defendant of due process.
A fourth factor to be considered is the personal effect delay will
have on the defendant. It is generally held that a defendant has a
right to be free from the oppressive effect of holding criminal prosecu-
tions suspended over him for an indefinite time.2 2 Thus, in United
States v. Maroney2 3 an additional factor which persuaded the court
to find a violation of due process was that the delay was upsetting
20 Supra note 12.
21 Supra note 11.




emotionally to the defendant, and the delay required him to spend
money to protect his rights.
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Apart from the constitutional questions involved, there are strong
policy reasons for requiring a trial or dismissal of charges contained
in detainer warrants.
If a future conviction on the charge would be constitutionally
questionable, it would be in the interests of good law enforcement
to require district attorneys to try prisoners made available by the
imprisoning sovereignty.
Further, it would seem to be poor penology to allow prison
privileges, in effect at least, if not by law, to rest in the hands of the
prosecuting officer of another sovereignty, especially where the de-
tainer warrant has been issued on mere suspicion. As the Ohio court
stated in State v. Milner:2 4
The exercise of such control over a form of installment
punishment, compounded by detainers, is a usurpation of the
power of the court, of the jury, and of the parole board to
determine guilt and punishment.
The Wisconsin legislature has recognized the potential unfairness
of pending detainers by enacting the Prompt Disposition of Intrastate
Detainers Act.25 That statute requires the trial, or the dismissal, of
Wisconsin detainers filed against a Wisconsin prisoner.
At the instance of the Parole and Probation Compact Administra-
tor's Association and the Council of State Governments a "Joint Com-
mittee on Detainers" has been organized with representation from
that body, and from the National Association of Attorneys General,
the ABA Section on Criminal Law, the National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws, and the American Correctional
Association. This group has formulated a model statute on intrastate
detainers, 26 and has recommended an interstate compact which it is
now studying to authorize mandatory disposition of detainers. 27 The
Commissioner's Prefatory note to the model intrastate detainer act 28
indicates the need for a method of disposing of detainers "to the end
that valid charges will be ripened into trials, whereas detainers merely
lodged on suspicion or less will be dismissed. Competent authorities
estimate that as many as 50% of warrants now lodged against prisoners
are never intended to be prosecuted."
Thus, there has been a trend in recent years to attempt to solve
24 60 Ohio Op. 2d 206, 149 N.E. 2d 189, 191 (1958).
25 Wis STAT. §955.22 (1961).
26 UNIFORM MANDATORY DISPOSITION OF DETAINER AcT, 9B U.L.A. (Supp. 1962).
27 See 9B U.L.A. (Supp. 1962).
28 Supra note 26.
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the problems created by detainer warrants, and to attempt to achieve
justice in this area.
STATE ex rel FREDENBERG V. EBERLEIN
Petitioner, Marvin G. Fredenberg, was a prisoner in a federal
penitentiary in Sandstone, Minnesota. Several detainer warrants had
been filed against him for crimes allegedly committed in Wisconsin.
Petitioner sought to be tried in Wisconsin on the charges for which
the warrants had been issued, or in the alternative, sought dismissal
of the warrants. He petitioned the Wisconsin Supreme Court, in pro
per, for a writ of mandamus, naming the district attorney of the
county where the crimes allegedly had been committed as defendant.
November 21, 1962, the Supreme Court issued an alternative writ
of mandamus, without opinion, compelling the district attorney:
. . . to take such steps as may be available to obtain the
return of petitioner to Wisconsin for trial on said charges; or,
in the alternative, to apply to the proper court for the dismissal
of same, or, in the alternative, to show cause before this court
why neither should be done.29
December 11, 1962, the defendant district attorney made the fol-
lowing return to the writ: ,
That acting upon the advice and counsel of the Attorney
General your respondent states that he will within twenty (20)
days after this Return take all necessary steps and procedures
to secure the limited custody of the petitioner for the pur-
pose of returning him to Shawano County for trial for the
offenses alleged to have occurred in Shawano County.
30
The petitioner was returned to Shawano County, convicted of the
offense, and returned to the federal prison.
Because the defendant district attorney sought and obtained the
return of the prisoner there was no need for further factual determi-
nation upon which a violation of due process could be predicted. The
action of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, however, is precedent which
may be valuable in cases involving less cooperative district attorneys.
29 State ex rel Fredenberg v. Eberlein, No. St. 40, 1962 Term, Wisconsin Supreme
Court.301d.
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